The Indian Ocean swallowed up Airbus. Accidents, incidents and plane crashes in the USSR and Russia Accidents with the Airbus A310
March 22, 1994 in the area of Mezhdurechensk (Kemerovo region) at 20 o'clock. 58 minutes crashed and crashed the Airbus A-310 belonging to the airline " Russian airlines»And made a flight on the route Moscow - Hong Kong. There were 63 passengers and 12 crew members on board. The autopsy of the black boxes subsequently showed that the cause of the disaster was the human factor, the crew's poor knowledge of this type of equipment and gross violation of instructions.
3.5 hours after takeoff, the crew commander Yaroslav Kudrinsky called his two children into the cockpit - his daughter Yana and his son Eldar, where, in violation of the charter, he allowed his daughter and then his son to sit in the ship's commander's chair. This circumstance was ignored by the other crew members. In addition, in the cockpit was a friend of the Kudrinskys' family - Makarov, also a pilot who flew on the same flight as a passenger.
Before allowing the children to take the command chair, Kudrinsky turned on the autopilot. First, the commander's daughter, 13-year-old Yana Kudrinskaya, was in the pilot's seat. She did not try to take any action to control the plane. After her, the captain's son, 15-year-old Eldar Kudrinsky, sat at the helm. The teenager held on to the steering wheel, rocking it slightly from side to side. Everything was perceived as distraction and the adults did not control the teenager. At one point, the guy swung the steering wheel harder and the autopilot, taking it for the pilot's command, turned off. In one second, the plane became obedient to the teenager, who continued to play pilots.
The light signaling of disabling the autopilot mode went off, but the crew did not notice this, since the design feature of the A310 is the absence of an audible alarm for disabling the autopilot. Having tilted the steering wheel handle to the side once again, the boy put the airbus into a deep roll, which soon reached 45 degrees and caused an overload of about 5g. In the first seconds, both professional pilots could not understand the reason for the abnormal behavior of the aircraft for several seconds. And when the crew members noticed that the autopilot was disabled, they tried to take their seats again.
Contrary to the instructions, the co-pilot, in the absence of the commander in his seat, pushed his seat back all the way, which for a long time did not allow him to take a working position due to the resulting overloads. And the aircraft commander could not get into his seat for a long time due to strong G-forces and a large roll angle.
The situation was greatly complicated by the fact that the only person who had the physical ability to fly the plane was still in the left seat - the commander's 15-year-old son, who received and tried to carry out various, inconsistent and contradictory commands from his father, co-pilot and Makarov. According to the analysis of the soundtrack of the "black box", Eldar's attempts to rectify the situation were greatly hampered by ignorance of the pilot's jargon. As an example, the command "Hold the steering wheel!" Was given, which the boy took for the command to hold the steering wheel in the extreme right position, while the pilots meant the command to level the plane.
In the meantime, the roll had already reached 90 °, and the plane began to lose altitude. In order to prevent a further decrease in the autopilot (only the roll automaton was turned off), the pitch angle increased to such an extent that the plane began to quickly lose speed and went into a stall. The co-pilot completely turned off the machine gun and managed to get the plane out of the stall by lowering the nose. The congestion lessened, and the commander finally managed to get his son out of his chair and take his workplace. The pilots brought the plane into normal flight mode, but could not recognize their spatial position in time. Flying over the hill at low altitude, the plane caught on the edges of trees and crashed into the forest near the village of Maly Maizas, about 20 kilometers southeast of Mezhdurechensk.
Crew talks, chronology of events
Notation used in the text:
PIC - aircraft commander Ya.V. Kudrinsky
Yana is the daughter of the commander, born in 1981
Eldar - the son of the commander, born in 1978
2P - co-pilot I. V. Piskarev
Makarov - a pilot flying to Hong Kong as a passenger
E - someone from the cockpitBefore the disaster - about half an hour. The plane is flying on autopilot. In the cockpit are the aircraft commander, the co-pilot and two outsiders - the aircraft commander's daughter Yana and the passenger Makarov.
17:43:30: FAC [addressing his daughter Yana]: Come sit here now, on my chair, do you want?
17:43:31: PIC left his workplace
17: 43: 34-17: 43: 37: Yana sat down in the FAC chair
17:44:10: Yana: Dad, pick me up [Yana asked to lift her chair up]
2P: Novosibirsk, Aeroflot, 593rd we are passing your point at echelon 10 100.
17:47:06: FAC: Well, Yana, will you fly?
Yana: No!
FAC: Don't press the buttons. Don't touch this red one!
Yana: Dad, can you twist this?
FAC: Do you see Novokuznetsk on the left?
Yana: Are we flying so low?
PIC: Ten thousand one hundred meters.
Yana: That's a lot, right?
FAC: A lot ...
Yana tries to leave the chair.
FAC: Wait, take your time ...
Yana: I'm already careful ...
17:51:12: Yana left the PIC chair
The son of the commander of the Eldar aircraft appears.
17:51:47: Makarov: The counter is being removed.
17:51:55: Eldar sat down in the PIC's chair.
17:52:46: Eldar [addressing Makarov]: Are you filming?
17:52:48: Makarov: I'm filming.
Eldar: Can I twist this?
17:54:25: PIC: Yes! If you turn left, where will the plane go?
Eldar: Left!
FAC: Turn! Turn left!
17:54:35: FAC: So, look beyond the ground where you will turn. Let's go left, turn left!
Eldar: Great!
17:54:37: FAC: Come on, huh?
17:54:39: Eldar turned the steering wheel to the left by 3-4 degrees.
17:54:40: PIC: Is the plane going to the left?
17:54:41: Eldar: Coming.
17:54:42: FAC: Not visible, right?
NS:< неразб>
17:54:50: E: Now it will go to the right
17:54:53: Makarov: You put him on the artificial horizon normally.
17:05:05: The plane began to roll to the right.
17:55:12: FAC: What do you, Yana, want?
Yana:< неразб>
17:55:15: FAC [addressing Yana]: Why?
Yana:< неразб>
17:55:18: FAC [addressing Yana]: In first grade, you will only sleep.
17:55:27: FAC [addressing Yana]: Don't run there, otherwise we will be kicked out of work.
17:55:28: From that time on, unnoticed by either the PIC or the co-pilot, a gradual increase in the right bank began.
17:55:36: Eldar [about the course of the plane]: Why is he turning?
17:55:38: FAC: Does it turn itself?
17:55:40: Eldar: Yes.
17:55:41: E: Why does he turn?
17:55:42: Eldar: I don't know.
17:55:45: FAC: Will you miss the course?
17:55:45: Makarov: He still turns the zone, guys. [Makarov suggested that the plane is leaving the holding area]
17:55:46: 2P: We went to the waiting area.
17:55:48: PIC: Yes?
17:55:49: 2P: Of course.
17:55:50: Makarov: Re-bya-ta! [Thus Makarov reacted to the rapid increase in vertical overload in the aircraft]
17:55:52: FAC: Here you go! Hold the wheel, hold it!
17:55:55: 2P: Speed!
17:55:56: 2P: W reverse side.
17:55:58: 2P: In the opposite direction.
17:55:59: 2P: Back!
17:55:59: FAC: Turn left! Left! Right! Left!
17:56:06: E: Right?
17:56:08: E: Can't you see, what?
17:56:11: Autopilot disconnected.
17:56:14: E: Turn right.
17:56:17: FAC: Right!
17:56:18: 2P: Yes to the left! The earth is here!
17:56:24: FAC: Eldar, come out!
17:56:26: PIC: Crawl back.
17:56:28: PIC: Crawl back, Eldar.
17:56:30: E: You see< неразб>No?
17:56:34: 2P: Ore for small!
17:56:38: PIC: Come out!
17:56:40: E: Come out, Eldar.
17:56:41: E: Come out< неразб>.
17:56:43: E: Come out.
17:56:44: E: Come out.
17:56:47: E:< неразб>.
17:56:49: E: Come out.
17:56:52: E: Come out, I say.
17:56:54: 2P: Full throttle! Full throttle! Full throttle!
17:56:55: By this time, the PIC had taken his workplace.
17:56:56: 2P: Gave gas!
17:56:57: PIC: Full throttle!
17:56:58: 2P: Dal!
17:56:59: E:< неразб>.
17:57:00: E: Full throttle.
17:57:05: E: I gave gas, gave.
17:57:08: E: What speed?
17:57:09: E:< неразб>.
17:57:13: E:< неразб>.
17:57:17: E: Okay.
17:57:23: PIC: Full gas!
17:57:25: 2P: The speed is very high!
17:57:27: E: Big, huh?
17:57:28: E: Big.
17:57:29: E: I turned it on.
17:57:30: PIC: Okay, that's it, we get out, we get out.
17:57:32: FAC: Right! Right leg!
17:57:35: PIC: High speed.
17:57:36: PIC: Take the gases away!
17:57:37: 2P: I got it right!
17:57:42: FAC: Quiet-oh-oh-nechku!
17:57:47: 2P: B ... again!
17:57:48: E: Don't turn right.
17:57:50: E: Speed added.
17:57:53: PIC: Let's get out now! Everything is fine!
17:57:55: PIC: Slowly on yourself.
17:57:56: PIC: Slowly.
17:57:57: FAC: Slowly, I say!
17:58:01: Airplane hitting the ground.
In the course of an investigation carried out jointly by Aeroflot and Airbus, changes were made to the aircraft documentation and the Aeroflot pilot training plan. And when flying on simulators, performed by Russian instructor pilot Vladimir Biryukov together with Airbus test pilots, it turned out that if both pilots could not reach the controls, the automatic control system would be able to intercept control and quickly restore a straight-line safe flight.
Plane crashA310 near Mezhdurechensk - the disaster that occurred on the night of March 22-23, 1994 with the airliner Airbus A310-308 of Aeroflot. Due to a child who accidentally turned off the autopilot and took control, the plane went into a tailspin and crashed near Mezhdurechensk. All 75 people on board were killed.
Developments
On March 22, 1994 at 20:39 local time, Aeroflot's Airbus A310 took off from the runway of Moscow Sheremetyevo Airport and headed for Hong Kong. The 63 passengers taken on board had nothing to worry about: the A310 with the assigned name M. Glinka was one of the first new European aircraft delivered to Aeroflot's fleet just a couple of years ago, the aircraft was operated by experienced pilots, and 9 flight attendants worked in the cabin.
The flight proceeded normally and, 3.5 hours after takeoff, the crew commander called his two children into the cockpit: daughter Yana and son Eldar. When the plane flew in the Novokuznetsk area, he allowed first his daughter and then his son to sit in the ship's commander's chair. In addition, there was a family friend in the cockpit, also an Aeroflot pilot who was on the same flight as a passenger.
Before allowing the children to take the command chair, the commander turned on the autopilot. First, the commander's daughter, 13-year-old Yana Kudrinskaya, sat at the helm. She did not try to take any action to control the plane. After her, the captain's son, 15-year-old Eldar, sat at the helm. The teenager held on to the steering wheel, rocking it slightly from side to side. This did not bother the crew, as the plane was under the control of the autopilot. However, in the end, Eldar applied a force of 8-10 kg to the steering wheel for 30 seconds, which led to a partial shutdown of the autopilot, which stopped giving commands to the ailerons - the crew did not know about this feature of the autopilot. Also, the pilots did not notice the light indication, and there was no sound signal.
Eldar was the first to notice the roll of the plane and reported it. However, for several seconds, both professional pilots could not understand the reason for the abnormal behavior of the aircraft.
The aircraft was banked to the right at a speed of about 1.5 ° per second, and soon the right bank reached 45 °, which is above the permissible limit. When the crew members noticed that the autopilot was disabled, they tried to take their seats again.
The co-pilot, having relaxed, strongly pushed his seat back and at a critical moment, due to overloads, could not return to his place. The commander also, due to overloads, could not sit in his chair. As a result, in conditions of severe loss of altitude with a roll, the only person to fly the plane was a 15-year-old boy. He was even more confused by the fact that he heard many commands from three people while often not understanding the pilot's jargon.
In the meantime, the roll had already reached 90 °, and the plane began to lose altitude. In order to prevent further decline, the autopilot increased the pitch angle to such an extent that the aircraft began to quickly lose speed and went into a stall. The co-pilot completely turned off the machine gun and managed to get the plane out of the stall by lowering the nose. The overload lessened, and the commander was finally able to get his son out of his chair and take his workplace. The pilots brought the plane into normal flight mode, but could not recognize their spatial position in time.
The airliner Airbus A310 with 75 people on board touched the edges of trees and crashed into the forest near Mezhdurechensk. No one survived.
Airplane crash investigation
Search and rescue operations at the crash site took quite a long time: the remains of passengers and the wreckage of the aircraft were scattered within a radius of 2 km. Later, the found parts of the aircraft were transported to the hangar. aviation enterprise Novokuznetsk airport, where they were attached to the frame according to the shape of the aircraft. In the same place, representatives of Aeroflot and Airbus began to study the circumstances of the disaster.
The first versions of the causes of the disaster seemed exotic: the plane either collided with a natural celestial body, or became a victim of a UFO. These assumptions were based on the fact that the airliner flew at an altitude of 10,100 meters, clearly maintained all the specified flight parameters, the crew did not give any alarm signals, there was no information about the failure of any instruments, the plane was controlled by an experienced crew. Later, there were rumors about an alleged terrorist attack and depressurization of the aircraft, which caused the instant death of the crew and passengers.
The Chairman of the Interstate Aviation Committee (IAC) Vladimir Kofman admitted several years later: “ The case is unprecedented. At that time, as they say, we did not have enough conscience or courage to declare that the plane was ruined by a child. But the recording on the voice recorder and further investigation, which lasted a whole year, showed that other options were excluded. After this incident, the journalists started talking in chorus about the "pilot's fault", the "human factor" in matters of accidents and so on. And we thought about something else - about the role of the co-pilot. After all, children were put at the wheel before. In fact, there is nothing wrong if the kid sits in the pilot's seat while the airliner is controlled by the autopilot. The question is: what did the partner do - the "technical reserve" of the happy father, while he was busy with his son? Instead of keeping an eye on the instruments and, if something happens, quickly take control, he went to the corner of the cockpit to shoot Eldar on a video camera. And he missed the moment when the boy turned the airbus over to manual control and did not notice the deep roll into which the plane had gone. When the pilots realized it, it was already too late ...».
Effects
Changes were made to the aircraft documentation and the Aeroflot pilot training plan. In particular, now in the flight manuals of all Airbus A310s, a clause has been made on the spontaneous deactivation of automatic aileron control when a force of more than 10 kg is applied to the steering wheel for 30 or more seconds. During flights on simulators, performed by Russian instructor pilot Vladimir Biryukov together with Airbus test pilots, it turned out that if both pilots could not reach the controls, then the automatic control system could quickly restore straight-line safe flight
Transcript of negotiations
The plane is flying over Novokuznetsk. Commander Jan's daughter sits at the helm.
Co-pilot: Novokuznetsk, Aeroflot 593, we are passing your point at flight level 10100.
FAC: Well, Yana, will you fly?
Yana: No!
FAC: Don't press the buttons. Don't touch this red one! ..
Yana: Dad, can you twist this?
FAC: Do you see Novokuznetsk on the left?
Yana: Are we flying so low?
PIC: Ten thousand one hundred meters.
Yana: That's a lot, right?
FAC: A lot ...
Yana leaves the commander's chair.
FAC: Wait, take your time ...
Yana: I'm already careful ...
The son of Eldar sits in the commander's chair.
Makarov: The pilot is filming.
Eldar: Are you filming?
Makarov: Taking pictures.
Eldar: Can I twist this?
FAC: Yes! If you turn left, where will the plane go?
Eldar: Left!
FAC: Turn! Turn left!
Eldar: Great!
FAC: Is the plane going to the left?
Eldar: Coming.
4 minutes pass.
Eldar: Why is he turning?
FAC: Does he turn himself?
Eldar: Yes.
FAC: Hold the steering wheel!
Co-pilot: Speed!
FAC: Turn left! Left! Right! Left! The earth is here! Eldar, come out! Get out, Eldar! Come out! Come out! Come out! Come out! Come out, I say! Full throttle!
Co-pilot: Got gas!
FAC: Full throttle!
Co-pilot: Dal!
FAC: Full gas!
Co-pilot: The speed is very high!
FAC: So! Let's get out! Right! Right leg! Remove the gases!
Co-pilot: I got it right!
FAC: Quietly-oh-oh-nechku!
Co-pilot: Bl ... b, again!
FAC: Don't turn right! Let's go out now! Everything is fine! Slowly on yourself, slowly! Slowly, I say!
Short crackle.
End of recording.
"(Computer reconstruction)
Fall from the echelon
Outsiders in the cockpit, unexplored features of aircraft instruments
Wreckage of A310 fuselage - fragment of the inscription "AEROFLOT"
Plane crash of flight SU593 took place on March 22, 1994 near Mezhdurechensk in the Kemerovo region. All 75 people on board were killed as a result of the fall of the A310 aircraft of Aeroflot.
The main cause of the crash was an unacceptable situation in which the aircraft commander put his fifteen-year-old son at the helm of the airliner, whose unintentional actions led to a partial shutdown of the autopilot. Secondary reasons were the undocumented behavior of the autopilot, and the absence, at that time, in the crew training program of decision-making rules in such situations.
Crew
Flight
Flight 593 was operated by Airbus A310-304 (F-OGQS M. Glinka) from Moscow Sheremetyevo Airport (SVO) to Kaitak Airport, Hong Kong (HKG). The crew commander Yaroslav Kudrinsky took on board his two children - daughter Yana and son Eldar. When the plane was flying in the Novokuznetsk area, Kudrinsky, in violation of the charter, allowed first his daughter and then his son to sit in the ship's commander's chair. This circumstance was ignored by the other crew members.
Catastrophe
Before allowing the children to take the command chair, Kudrinsky turned on the autopilot. The daughter of the commander did not try to take any action to control the aircraft. After her, the captain's son, 15-year-old Eldar Kudrinsky, sat at the helm. The teenager was holding on to the steering wheel, slightly rocking it from side to side, which could not lead to disabling the autopilot by "overpowering". However, in the end, Eldar applied a force of 8-10 kg to the steering wheel for 30 seconds, which led to a partial shutdown of the autopilot, which stopped giving commands to the ailerons, which, in turn, caused an uncontrollable roll to the right side. Prior to that, this feature of the A310 autopilot was unknown to the crew. The light signaling of the mode shutdown went off, but the crew did not notice this, since the design feature of the A310 is the absence of the audible signaling of the autopilot shutdown.
Eldar was the first to notice the roll of the plane and reported this to his father. However, for several seconds, both professional pilots could not understand the reason for the abnormal behavior of the aircraft. As the trackline on the screen changed to a circle, the co-pilot assumed that the aircraft had entered a "holding zone", that is, it was describing large-diameter circles - a flight pattern used while waiting for a landing clearance.
The plane was banked to the right at a speed of about 1.5 ° per second, and soon the right bank reached 45 °, which is above the permissible limit. This caused significant positive overloads (4.8 g). When the crew members noticed that the autopilot was disabled, they tried to take their seats again.
Contrary to the instructions, the co-pilot, in the absence of the commander in his seat, pushed his seat back all the way, which for a long time did not allow him to take a working position due to the overloads that had arisen. The aircraft commander could not get into his seat for a long time due to strong G-forces and a large roll angle.
The situation was greatly complicated by the fact that in the left seat there was still the only person who had the physical ability to fly the plane - the 15-year-old son of the commander, who received and tried to carry out various, inconsistent and contradictory commands from his father, co-pilot and a third adult in the cockpit - a friend the family of the crew commander, also a pilot who flew on the same flight and came to the cockpit with the children. According to the analysis of the soundtrack of the "black box", Eldar's attempts to rectify the situation were greatly hampered by ignorance of the pilot's jargon. As an example, the command "Hold the steering wheel!" Was given, which the boy took for the command to hold the steering wheel in the extreme right position, while the pilots meant the command to level the plane.
In the meantime, the roll had already reached 90 °, and the plane began to lose altitude. In order to prevent further descent, the autopilot (only the roll automaton was turned off) increased the pitch angle to such an extent that the plane began to quickly lose speed and went into a stall. The co-pilot completely turned off the machine gun and managed to get the plane out of the stall by lowering the nose. The congestion lessened, and the commander was finally able to get his son out of his chair and take his workplace. The pilots brought the plane into normal flight mode, but could not recognize their spatial position in time. Flying over a hill at low altitude, the plane caught on the edges of trees and crashed into the forest near the village of Maly Maizas, about 20 kilometers southeast of Mezhdurechensk.
Consequences of the plane crash
In the course of an investigation carried out jointly by Aeroflot and Airbus, changes were made to the aircraft documentation and the training plan for Aeroflot pilots. In particular, now in the flight manual on the website airdisaster.ru
By the beginning of the playback of the magnetic recording of the conversations in the cockpit (17:26:52), the reserve PIC was in the left pilot's seat, and the co-pilot was in the right pilot's seat. The aircraft commander was resting in the passenger compartment.
From 17:40, the passenger PIC and the children of the reserve PIC were in the cockpit. At 17:43:31, the reserve PIC left his workplace without transferring control of the aircraft to the co-pilot, who was then alternately taken by his daughter and then by his son (in violation of the requirements of NPP GA-85, clauses 7.1.3; 7.1.4 ; 7.1.5).
In the time interval between 17:43:34 and 17:43:37, Yana sat in the left seat of the village and at 17:44:10 she asked her father to raise the chair up. At 17:47:06 the reserve PIC suggested to his daughter to "pilot" the plane ("Well, Yana, will you fly? Hold on to the steering wheel, hold on"). In the period from 17:47:10 to 17:50:44, using the autopilot heading device to demonstrate the aircraft control daughter, a maneuver was made to the left from the course 111 ° to 102 °, then to the right to 115 °, followed by (after 2 minutes 40 seconds . after the start of the maneuver) the aircraft will enter the preset course 102 °. After the aircraft entered this course, Yana vacated the PIC's seat at 17:51:12, remaining in the pilot's cabin.
During 7.5 minutes, when the daughter of the reserve PIC was in the PIC's pilot seat, there were conversations between the father and daughter, distracting the crew from controlling the flight parameters.
From 17:50:04 to 17:50:46 the co-pilot made a report to the controllers Novosibirsk-control and Novokuznetsk-control about the passage of Novokuznetsk and the planned time of passage of the Zakir checkpoint at 17:59.
At 17:51:55 the left seat of the PIC was taken by the son of the reserve PIC, Eldar. the reserve PIC decided to demonstrate to him the principles of piloting an airplane by performing a similar maneuver just shown to his daughter. At 17:54:25, at the request of his son to "turn" the steering wheel, the reserve PIC gave permission and at 17:54:35 he said: "So, look beyond the ground where you are going to turn." Let's go left, turn left! "
The son of the reserve PIC, starting from 17:54:39, made efforts to the left steering wheel, deviating it to the left by 3 ... 4 ° for 5 seconds. At the same time, the autopilot worked to parry the roll created by the deviation of the right aileron. At 17:54:44 the reserve PIC turned on the “heading generator” submode and turned the autopilot heading controller handle to turn left by more than 15 ° from the initial heading 105 °, which created a left roll of 21.5 ° and reduced efforts on the steering wheel. At 17:54:52 with a left bank of 17 ... 19 °, the reserve PIC turned the dial knob to the right to return to the initial course of 105 °. The autopilot deflected the ailerons to reduce the left roll.
Thus, in contrast to the previous maneuver, with the permission of the reserve PIC, his son made efforts to the left steering wheel, keeping it in a position close to neutral
The co-pilot was holding the right steering wheel at this time, possibly insuring him against deviations by the son of the reserve PIC - from 17:54:58 left or right, or at the same time both steering wheels were held in position 3 ... 5 ° to the right.
From 17:55:05 the aircraft went from the left to the right bank.
Holding the control wheels while the aircraft was making turns with variable in magnitude and direction of rolls led to the counteraction of the steering gear of the autopilot, the appearance of variable in magnitude and direction of forces on the held control wheels, and was the reason for the inadvertent non-signaled (instrumental) disconnection of the autopilot from the aileron control wiring, which occurred in 17 : 55: 25 with an increase in the total effort on the controls up to 11 ... 13 kg.
Studies have shown that the disconnection of the autopilot from the aileron control while holding the helm (s) occurs when forces are less than those stated in the Flight Manual (FLE) and other regulatory documents (15 ... 17 kg). By holding both controls, the forces can be distributed between them in such a way that the moment of disconnection can be unnoticed by the pilot.
There is no proper information in the flight manual, and in the flight personnel training program there is a methodology and training for recognizing the disconnection of the autopilot from the roll channel control and the peculiarities of piloting an aircraft with the autopilot disconnected by roll.
Since in the process of overpowering and after disconnecting the autopilot, the controls were held in a position corresponding to a slight deviation of the ailerons to the right roll, the aircraft continued to increase the roll. The increase in roll remained unnoticed by the crew due to the distraction of its attention by unauthorized persons in the cockpit and the absence of light and sound signals on the aircraft about the disconnection of the autopilot. Moreover, even after disconnecting the autopilot, the alarm system on the aircraft continued to provide the crew with information about its operation in the previously specified mode, although the autopilot stopped performing its function of stabilization and control in the roll channel.
When the roll reached 20 °, at 17:55:36, the ailerons were additionally deflected by 1.5 ... 2 ° to the right bank. It was not possible to establish to which of the steering wheels the efforts were made to additionally deflect the ailerons. Due to the additional deflection of the steering wheel, the right roll of the aircraft began to increase more intensively, by 17:55:49 it exceeded its operational limit - 45 ° and continued to remain unnoticed by the crew. After reaching this roll, the autopilot could not fully perform its functions to stabilize the altitude. The plane went into descent.
From 17:55:12 to 17:55:36 the reserve PIC was distracted from control over his son's actions and flight parameters by talking with his daughter.
At 17:55:36, Eldar, who was still in the left pilot's seat, was the first to notice "something incomprehensible" and drew the attention of his father, who was in conversation with Yana: "Why is he turning?" the reserve PIC replied: "Does it turn itself?" Eldar confirmed "Yes". Since then, the pilots in the cockpit have been involved in the search for an explanation of why the plane is "turning". At 17:55:45, the passenger PIC suggested that the aircraft was leaving the holding area and was supported by the co-pilot.
The autopilot, which continues to perform its functions in the pitch channel to maintain the flight altitude during the roll development, even after disconnecting the steering gear, brought the aircraft to the aerodynamic shaking mode and high angles of attack.
The crew discovered a dangerous situation only by the increase in overload and the appearance of the aircraft shaking (buffet) from 17:55:52. By this time, the roll has reached more than 50 °, the angle of attack is 4 ... 4.5 °, and the vertical overload is 1.6 units. Simultaneously with the appearance of buffing in 2 seconds, the angle of attack changed from 4.5 ° to 10 ° with practically unchanged deflections of the elevator and stabilizer, which indicates the manifestation of "catch" in the angle of attack.
the reserve PIC gave the command “Hold! Take the helm! Here you go! " and after 2 sec. after the appearance of buffeting with a roll of 63 °, the co-pilot took vigorous measures to get the aircraft out of the right bank by completely deflecting the steering wheel to the left. At the same time, who understood the command in his address and literally the son of the reserve PIC held the left steering wheel in a position close to neutral for 3 ... 4 seconds, as a result of which the left aileron and three of the five spoilers on the left wing were not deflected. This, combined with an increase in the angle of attack, reduced the efficiency of the lateral control of the aircraft (although it did not have a decisive effect), which did not allow to reduce the right roll, which reached 90 ° 19 seconds after turning the steering wheel to the left.
The crew's actions to counter the roll were generally inadequate to the situation. The expedient actions to bring the aircraft to operational angles of attack and restore lateral controllability would be to deactivate the autopilot, recoil the steering wheel "from itself" to reduce the angle of attack, then take the aircraft out of roll and descent.
In the process of parrying the roll, the autopilot, upon a signal to decrease the set flight altitude, rejected the elevator to pitch up, which accelerated the aircraft's exit to high angles of attack and stall. At the same time, fulfilling the commands of the reserve PIC and the PIC-passenger "In the opposite direction, turn left!" and shifted almost to the rearmost position of the seat and so had limited opportunities for piloting the aircraft.
Between 17:55:58 and 17:56:11, the Alarms "Departure from the set height" (twice), "Stall warning" and "Disable autopilot" were activated.
At the same time, the aircraft with a right bank of 80 ... 90 ° increased the pitch angle for diving from -15 ° to -50 ° with speed acceleration with a vertical overload of about 2 units.
The intervention of the crew in the pitch control by deflecting the steering wheel column led at 17:56:11 to the autopilot shutdown and the corresponding alarm.
After turning off the autopilot, the automatic system of protection from reaching high angles of attack was triggered, which deflected the stabilizer to dive from -1 ° to -0.5 °. At the same time, the elevator was also deflected for a dive from -7.5 ° to + 2.5 °. These actions led to a decrease in the angle of attack to + 7 °, an increase in the average vertical speed of descent to 200 m / s, an increase in vertical overload and speed above the maximum permissible values. At the same time, from 17:56:04 to 17:56:18 the spatial orientation of the roll was lost by the crew. Having regained orientation, the co-pilot brought the aircraft out of the roll by deviating the steering wheel to the left. The aircraft remained in a dive with a pitch angle of up to 40 °. The speed reached 740 km / h by 17:56:29. The co-pilot, having taken the control wheel "on himself", rejected the elevator to pitch up to the mechanical stop, which created an overload of 4.6 ... 4.7 units above the established strength limits.
The reserve PIC continued to try to take his workplace, giving cues to his son "Come out, come out!"
Almost simultaneously with the deviation of the elevator to pitch up, the crew reduced the engine operating mode. The action of these two factors led to an intensive drop in the indicated speed to 185 ... 220 km / h by 17:56:41. At this moment, someone (either Eldar, getting up from the chair, or a reserve PIC, taking it) abruptly deflected the rudder to an angle of about 8 ° by involuntarily giving the pedal. The aircraft switched to a sharp right roll with ailerons deflected to the left, completing a corkscrew barrel. After stalling and performing a spin roll at angles of attack of 30 ... 35 °, the aircraft switched to left rotation with an increase in the dive angle to 80 ... 90 ° and a decrease in vertical overload to zero, i.e. to zero gravity.
At 17:56:54 the co-pilot, noting that the speed had decreased to less than 180 km / h, gave the command “Full throttle!” Three times. The plane at that moment was practically in a steep dive and the initial phase of acceleration. The posture of the reserve PIC in the seat, which took its place by 17:56: 40… 17:56: 46, with his height of 170 cm and the seat shifted to the almost extreme rear position, did not provide normal control of the aircraft.
By 17:57:11 the speed reached 370 km / h, the aircraft slowed down the roll (roll leveled off within 20 ... 22 °, the pitch angle decreased to -20 °. The reserve PIC tried to stop it by alternating deflection of the pedal against rotation, which he managed to do at 17:57:56 at an altitude of about 300 ... 400 m. After stalling two turns in a spin to the left, with an average vertical speed of 75 m / s at 17:58:01 (0:58 on March 23 local time), the aircraft collided with the ground, completely destroyed and partially burned out. passengers were killed.
In 1994 in many media mass media it was reported that on March 22 at 20.58.01 Moscow time in the area of Mezhdurechensk a passenger airbus A-310-300 "Glinka" crashed.
It belonged to Russian Airlines and operated on the Moscow-Hong Kong route. "All 75 people on board were killed."
In these messages, the indication of the exact time of the disaster, the flight number, the name of the airline and the liner itself were unusual. Otherwise, it was not much different from others who reported the same aircraft crashes in different parts of our planet.
But gradually, many newspapers began to focus on this particular disaster. Moskovsky Komsomolets responded to the results of the first studies with the article "Witnesses who do not disappear." In it, in particular, it was noted that there is always a reason and even a number of reasons for which disasters occur.
“The last witnesses in this case are the“ black boxes ”, which keep a tape recording of everything that happens in the cockpit until the very last minute: negotiations with the Earth, commands, cries for help.
Airbus "Glinka", flying to Hong Kong with 63 passengers on board, suddenly disappeared from the screens and, without giving any signals, fell from a height of 10 100 meters. The rescue teams sent to the crash site found the wreckage of the airliner within a few hours. Parts of the tail, wings, cockpit of the aircraft were scattered separately from each other. Only heaps of ash remained of himself.
Airbus A-310-300
Of the three black boxes, only two survived. They were burnt and deformed, but the records in them have survived. They were deciphered in France in the presence of members of the Russian State Commission. The first versions seemed simply fantastic: the plane either collided with a natural celestial body pulled into the gravitational zone, or became a victim ... of a UFO.
These assumptions were based on the fact that the airliner flew at a 10-kilometer altitude, clearly withstood all the specified flight parameters and did not give an SOS signal. Later, there was still a rumor about an alleged terrorist act and depressurization of the hull, which caused the instant death of the crew and passengers.
News agencies put forward their assumption: the pilots were allowed to sit at the controls of the plane for children. One of them pressed the wrong button, and the plane began to fall.
However, all competent persons unanimously declare that this cannot be true and nothing like that - in principle! - cannot happen. Russian scientist A.F. Chernyaev, analyzing the situation with the airliner, claims that there is simply no such button that can bring out the entire aircraft control system. The voices of children that are heard in the "black box" do not speak of anything by themselves.
Maybe the children were not even in the cockpit, but simply stood in the aisle, watching the work of the crew. According to international rules, this is not at all prohibited. On the contrary, in an aircraft of this class, the doors should always be open during the flight so that passengers feel calmer and more confident.
Further events developed as follows. The aircraft commander is perplexed that the autopilot is suddenly making an unplanned maneuver. After that, the liner suddenly falls on its side and begins to lose height. The crew tries to rectify the situation, but nothing works for them - something does not work there.
Only at the very ground did the pilots manage to level the plane, but then an explosion was heard. The last words before the explosion were: "We did it ..."
Maybe the plane hit one of the hills, lost its wing and began to crumble in parts? The place where the wreckage of the airliner was found speaks of just such a fall.
At the test stand in Toulouse, Russian and French specialists have reproduced the A-310 flight many times. But even in the calm atmosphere of the earthly "flight", the technique refused to reproduce those unthinkable pirouettes that the dying liner wrote in the air.
After an unexpected descent from a height of 10,000 meters, the A-310 rushed to the Earth either in a tailspin or in a deep spiral. Even a coup on the back was recorded, which is completely excluded for transport aircraft. Thus, even after returning from France, the group of Russian experts was unable to name the cause of the disaster. It was only by the end of October that experts from the two countries seemed to have established it.
However, Russian citizens could not then familiarize themselves with these dramatic conclusions. According to international rules, a country investigating a catastrophe on its territory must first familiarize the manufacturer and owner of the aircraft with all the findings. It is hardly possible to get acquainted with these details even now, because the documents seem to have established that the life and fate of the 75 people on board the plane was really decided by the "child" factor.
The crew commander Kudrinsky took his children, 12-year-old Yana and 14-year-old Eldar, to spend spring holidays in Hong Kong. The roll of the plane arose from the simultaneous impact on the steering wheel of Eldar and the autopilot.
Here Eldar sits down in the left chair, and his eyes flare up. Still would! Which of his peers does not dream of sitting at the helm of an airplane, and even during a flight!
The aircraft lifted its nose more and more, increased the angle of attack of the wing (that is, as if it was specifically striving for a position ideal for stalling into a tailspin). At some point, this is exactly what happened with a car that was absolutely not designed for flying in this mode. It turned out to be just as unusual for the crew.
This disaster became one of the most tragic and mysterious in the Russian aviation. The Airbus was so technically advanced that there were only two people in its crew - the first and the second pilot. All the rest of the control was distributed among the electronic devices.
The last communication session "Glinka" took place with the city of Novokuznetsk at 20.49.47. The next one was supposed to be in ten minutes, but by that time not a single person was alive on the plane. In a few minutes the liner will get out of control and begin its "death dance".
In the meantime, everything on board seems to be calm. It was calm on the ground.
A.F. Chernyaev, who has been studying the properties and effects of ether for many years, has repeatedly written in his works that there is a physical ether. The life of people rising into the air largely depends on his behavior. The scientist was closely studying this whole situation with the Russian airbus and believes that by this time, apparently, the plane was already going in a dense etheric-air cloud.
Its signal on the radar screens either already began to pulsate, or disappeared altogether. And if this was indeed the case, then the disappearance of the signal should have served as a signal to the ground controller that the plane was in danger. And then he would still have a few minutes to warn the Airbus crew about her.
By this time (20.51.15) the pilots were already (apparently under the influence of the ether) inhibited and inadequately perceived the situation. Devices under the influence of ethereal electrons also began to supply distorted information to the computer. From that moment, when Eldar began active piloting, the plane was doomed. The son practiced with might and main with the steering wheel, and soon the huge liner gradually begins to obey the child - in spite of the working autopilot.
The car began to lose the altitude and speed set by the autopilot. Soon, Eldar was surprised to see that the land "floated under the side." The autopilot tried to correct the changed parameters, according to the program laid down in it. Automatics began to "take" the steering wheel, Eldar turned it in his direction. For a while, piloting was carried out in two hands - the autopilot and the child, each trying to "convince" the other that he was right. However, as noted by A.F. Chernyaev, everything could have happened exactly the opposite: both the machine gun and the person worked harmoniously.
However, the moment came when the young man realized that the plane was turning on its own. To understand this, he had to not act on the steering wheel for at least a few seconds. These seconds would be enough for the autopilot to level off the flight. If the aircraft's instruments hadn't been lying, if the airliner had been in a normal environment and had enough engine power ...
Soon the plane began to tremble violently. Along with the shaking, a deafening roar burst into the cockpit, because powerful overloads arose on board. The car rolls to the left more and more, the shaking intensifies, but the autopilot is still working. Apparently, they are trying to remove Eldar from the seat, but due to the increasing acceleration and three-fold overloads, he is simply pressed into the seat.
The guy, distraught with fear, is trying to get out of the chair (father and one of the passengers), but then his foot accidentally rests on the right gas pedal. And the plane, going at an extremely low ("stall") speed and lifting its nose up to the limit, immediately falls to the right through its back. Pilots call this the "corkscrew". It was at this moment that the autopilot shutdown signal went off and Glinka began its irreversible movement towards the ground. Prior to that, for fifteen seconds the autopilot fought with a person, creating dizzying manipulations with the plane. And only when the machine reached a critical roll, it (as indicated in the instructions for its operation) turned off.
True, at this time Eldar had already been removed from the chair, and passenger Vladimir Makarov was jumping in his place. The pilots seemed to feel in a familiar environment and began to take control of the situation. The crew tried to get the car out of a deep spiral by increasing the speed.
Prior to this, the state of "ethereal" intoxication did not allow pilots to simultaneously track several parameters, comprehend the situation and only then make decisions. The crew's attention was focused only on individual operations. This is probably why, in two and a half minutes, no one remembered about radio communications and about their duties to inform the ground dispatcher about all the problems on board.
At 20.58 the plane began to lift its nose and level out, coming out of a spin. At this moment, there was a visible hope for a successful outcome. But it was already too late! The earth was at a distance of three hundred meters, and there were four seconds left before colliding with it ...
Probably (and even obligatory), there are other points of view and other explanations for the cause of the Glinka airliner crash. After all, experts from the two countries could not establish its exact cause. But A.F. Chernyaev believes that it is impossible to change the physics of the ether, and it was she who invisibly played a fatal role in this tragedy.